

Message Text

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USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-14 SAJ-01 NIC-01 OMB-01 NEA-10

EURE-00 EPA-04 CEQ-02 SCI-06 DRC-01 EB-11 COME-00

TRSE-00 /173 W

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8538

INFO AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USMISSION BERLIN

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 15983

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: GW, UR, PFOR

SUBJECT: FRG FONMIN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

REF: BONN 15251

1. SUMMARY: FRG FONOFF SOVIET DIVISION CHIEF BRIEFED
EMBOFF ON FONMIN SCHEEL'S OCTOBER 31 TO NOVEMBER 3
VISIT TO MOSCOW. SCHEEL'S TALK WITH GROMYKO AND HIS
TWO-HOUR TALK WITH KOSYGIN FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON WEST
BERLIN QUESTIONS AND BILATERAL PROBLEMS. OUR CONTACT,
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WHO ACCOMPANIED SCHEEL, SAID THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE VISIT

WAS GOOD BUT THAT THERE IS STILL SOME WAY TO GO BEFORE OUTSTANDING ISSUES ARE RESOLVED. THE GERMAN ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE INTENT ON IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE FRG BUT WILL GIVE NOTHING AWAY IN THE BERLIN OR BILATERAL AREAS. GROMYKO WAS ALSO OUTSPOKEN ON THE MIDDLE EAST ALTHOUGH CAREFUL NOT TO GO TOO FAR IN STATING THE SOVIET PRECONDITIONS FOR A PEACE SOLUTION. END SUMMARY.

2. BERLIN. FONOFF REP TOLD US HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BRIEF US FULLY ON THE SCHEEL VISIT BY STATE SECRETARY FRANK. THE VISIT HAD COVERED BERLIN ISSUES IN SOME DETAIL. THE FRG SIDE HAD SUGGESTED THAT PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS BE FOUND TO THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS (OUTLINED IN BONN 14521) AND URGED ESPECIALLY THAT THE THORNY LEGAL ASSISTANCE QUESTION BE RESOLVED WITHOUT DAMAGE TO EITHER SIDE'S POSITION. SCHEEL EXPRESSLY PROPOSED A SOLUTION WHEREBY WEST BERLIN COURTS DEAL DIRECTLY WITH SOVIET COURTS, A PROCEDURE THAT WOULD, OF COURSE, APPLY TO FEDERAL GERMAN COURTS AS WELL SINCE, SCHEEL ASSERTED, THERE COULD BE NO DOUBLE STANDARD.

3. SOVIETS WERE REPORTEDLY RELUCTANT TO CONSIDER THIS IDEA BUT EVENTUALLY WERE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT THAT IT COULD BE CONSIDERED SUBSEQUENTLY BY EXPERT GROUPS FROM EACH SIDE. SOVIETS SAID THEY HAD TO CONSULT THEIR ALLIES ABOUT THE PROPOSAL AND HAD ALSO TO LOOK INTO THE POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS FOR DOMESTIC SOVIET LEGAL PROCEDURES. FRG SIDE REPORTEDLY STRESSED THAT ANY SOLUTION ALONG THE LINES PROPOSED WOULD HAVE TO BE WRITTEN, ALTHOUGH ONE COULD BE FLEXIBLE AS TO THE FORM OF THE AGREEMENT.

4. SOVIETS TOOK THE LINE THAT THEIR AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO CONSIDER SCHEEL'S PROPOSAL MEANT THAT THE FRG COULD THEN MOVE AHEAD AND CONCLUDE ITS NEGOTIATIONS RE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY AND BULGARIA. GERMANS SAID THEY WOULD AGREE TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS BUT WOULD NOT CONCLUDE THEM UNTIL THE FRG-USSR DIFFERENCES WERE RESOLVED. ON OTHER BERLIN ISSUES (BONN 14521), SCHEEL AND GROMYKO AGREED THAT

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THESE TOO COULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE EXPERTS GROUP. THE ISSUE OF THE FRG ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICE IN WEST BERLIN (MOSCOW 13523) DID NOT ARISE IN SCHEEL'S DISCUSSIONS. IT CAME UP VERY INDIRECTLY DURING ONE SIDE DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIETS. THE LATTER REJECTED THE IDEA OF INCLUDING ANY REFERENCE IN THE PROPOSED BILATERAL SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL AGREEMENT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE USSR'S SIGNING A SUBSIDIARY AGREEMENT

WITH ANY FRG OFFICE IN WEST BERLIN PURPORTING TO ACT
FOR ALL OF THE FRG. THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY HAVE MEANT
THE ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICE, INTER ALIA.

5. BILATERAL. SCHEEL RAISED WITH GROMYKO IN FORCE-
FUL TERMS THE MATTER OF THE EMIGRATION OF ETHNIC GERMANS
FROM THE USSR. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THIS ISSUE
COULD BE RESOLVED IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. GROMYKO
REFERRED TO THE 90 SO-CALLED HARD CASES(REMAINING FROM
THE LIST OF 250 GIVEN HIM BY SCHEEL IN 1971) AND PRO-
VIDED A REPORTEDLY UNFORTHCOMING RESPONSE AS TO WHY
THERE HAD BEEN NO MOVEMENT ON THESE. SCHEEL PRESSED FOR
AN EARLY SOLUTION AND THEN DESCRIBED A RANGE OF OTHER

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN

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INFO AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

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AREAS OF HUMANITARIAN RELATIONS WHERE THE USSR COULD BE HELPFUL AND SHOW ITS GOOD INTENTIONS (E.G. MARRIAGES, VISA PROBLEMS, ACCESS TO GERMANS IN SOVIET JAILS). THIS APPROACH SEEMINGLY BROUGHT NO SIGN OF A FORTH-COMING SOVIET REPLY.

6. SCHEEL RAISED THE MATTER OF RUDOLF HESS'S RELEASE FROM SPANDAU PRISON. (ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCE, SCHEEL FELT HE HAD TO DO SO BECAUSE OF INCREASINGLY HEAVY DOMESTIC PRESSURE ON THE MATTER IN THE FRG.) THE SOVIETS WERE REPORTEDLY DISPLEASED THAT THE SUBJECT WAS CONFIDENTIAL

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BROUGHT UP. THEY GAVE THEIR STANDARD REPLY THAT SINCE HESS HAD SHOWN NO SIGNS OF REGRET FOR HIS PART IN THE NAZI ERA, THEY WERE NOT INTERESTED IN RELEASING HIM.

7. ECONOMIC. SOVIETS RAISED THE MATTER OF LOW-INTEREST CREDITS TO FINANCE JOINT FRG-USSR ECONOMIC PROJECTS. SCHEEL TOOK THE LINE HE PREVIOUSLY TOLD US HE WOULD (BONN 15354), I.E. THAT ALTHOUGH GERMAN INTEREST RATES WERE HIGHER THAN OTHERS, THEIR BASIC PRICES WERE LOWER. IT WAS THEREFORE UP TO THE SOVIETS TO JUDGE WHETHER THE TOTAL FRG PROJECTS WERE COMPETITIVE ENOUGH TO WARRANT THE SOVIETS' ACCEPTING THEM. SCHEEL NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS MUST HAVE FOUND GERMAN GOODS AND SERVICES ATTRACTIVE ENOUGH SINCE THEY SEEMED TO BE BUYING THEM AT AN EVER FASTER PACE. IT WAS AGREED THAT THESE QUESTIONS OF CREDITS, PRICES AND COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC PROJECTS, ESPECIALLY INCLUDING SOVIET SUPPLY OF ENERGY TO THE FRG, COULD BE TAKEN UP BY THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMISSION AT ITS NEXT MEETING IN DECEMBER. (FYI: IN TALKING TO JOURNALISTS IN MOSCOW AT THE END OF THE VISIT, SCHEEL IS SAID TO HAVE COMMENTED THAT THE LOW-INTEREST CREDIT QUESTION HAD BEEN REMOVED "FROM THE TABLE". OUR IMPRESSION FROM OUR BRIEFING BY THE FONOFF REP IS THAT THE SITUATION IS STILL SOMEWHAT UNCLEAR. THIS LACK OF CLARITY IS NOT NEW IN SUCH SITUATIONS WHERE SCHEEL'S COTTON-WOOL ENVELOPING APPROACH IS PRESENT. END FYI.)

8. MIDDLE EAST. FONOFF GAVE US A REPORT ALONG THE LINES OF MOSCOW 13838. THE GERMANS WERE PARTICULARLY STRUCK BY GROMYKO'S REFUSAL TO LINK ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO THE OCTOBER 22 LINES WITH THE BEGINNING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. GROMYKO AND OTHER SOVIET OFFICIALS CARE-

FULLY REFRAINED FROM COMMENTING ON US-FRG DIFFERENCES
OVER US RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL FROM FRG TERRITORY. INTER-
ESTINGLY, GROMYKO'S DEFENSIVENESS ABOUT US-USSR COOPERA-
TION WAS ALSO REFLECTED IN HIS ASSERTION THAT THE
SOVIETS HAD COME UNDER STRONG CRITICISM FROM OTHER
COUNTRIES FOR THE LACK OF SOVIET CONSULTATIONS.

9. MBFR/CSCE. THE SOVIETS PROVIDED NO NEW INSIGHTS
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AS TO THEIR MBFR POSITION. RE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES, THE SOVIETS SAID THEY COULD NOT TAKE A CLEAR
POSITION UNTIL THEY KNEW MORE PRECISELY THE SIZE OF THE
TROOPS WHOSE MOVEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE NOTIFIED. RE
CSCE, THEY WERE HARD IN PUSHING FOR EARLY PROGRESS ON
BASKET ONE (PRINCIPLES) AND SAID THEY COULD NOT UNDER-
STAND THE DIFFICULTIES THE FRG SEEMED INTENT ON PRE-
SENTING IN THIS AREA. THEY ALSO INFORMED THE GERMAN
REPS THAT WHILE THE USSR WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS FULLY
BASKET THREE (FREER INFORMATION, CONTACTS, ETC.), IT
WOULD NOT PERMIT SOVIET SOCIETY TO BE INTERFERED WITH

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BY SUCH MEASURES AS SETTING COSTS OF VISA FEES, ETC.

10. COMMENT: FRG REP SAID THE GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE GERMAN DELEGATION WAS THAT THE SOVIETS REMAINED CLEARLY INTERESTED IN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE FRG. THE SOVIETS SEEMED DISAPPOINTED THAT THINGS HAVE NOT GONE AS SMOOTHLY AS THEY HAD HOPED AFTER CONCLUDING THE MOSCOW TREATY, ESPECIALLY IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD. THE SOVIETS NOW APPEARED TO HAVE ACCEPTED THAT THEY, LIKE THE GERMANS, WILL HAVE TO NEGOTIATE HARD ON BILATERAL ISSUES AND ON BERLIN ALL ACROSS THE BOARD.
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11. FRG FONOFF REP SAID HE EXPECTED THE GERMANS WOULD RESUME TALKS WITH THE CZECHS IN THE NEXT WEEK OR TWO. AS FOR MEETINGS OF THE FRG-SOVIET EXPERTS GROUP, HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THE SOVIETS MIGHT TRY TO STALL UNTIL THEY HAD SEEN HOW FAR THE CZECHS WERE ABLE TO MOVE IN THEIR NEGOTIATIONS WITH BONN. FONOFF REP SAID THAT WHILE LITTLE CONCRETE PROGRESS ON BERLIN MATTERS WAS MADE DURING THE VISIT, HE THOUGHT THERE HAD BEEN SOME VALUE IN GETTING THE SOVIETS ONCE AGAIN TO FACE UP TO THE FACT THAT WEST BERLIN REMAINED A KEY ELEMENT IN GERMAN OSTPOLITIK.

12. FINALLY, IN ANSWER TO EMBOFF'S QUERY ABOUT PRESS REPORTS OF A POSSIBLE BRANDT VISIT TO MOSCOW EARLY IN 1974, FONOFF REP SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THERE WAS NOTHING TO THESE REPORTS. THE MATTER HAD NOT ARISEN IN MOSCOW SO FAR AS HE KNEW.
HILLENBRAND

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